Defendants Receiving Harsher Sentences Following Trial
People often report that Judges gave them a harsher sentence after trial than they would have received if they had agreed to enter into a guilty plea. Unfortunately, this is often true. There are two reasons why this happens. Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Bias.
Prosecutors have great power to offer “deals” during plea negotiations. Frequently, the District Attorney will agree to a lesser sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. A guilty plea provides the defendant with a shorter prison sentence while allowing the District Attorney to have a “win” without the time and expense of proving their case at trial.
Unfortunately, once a defendant chooses to fight his/her case in court, all deals are off the table. After a jury trial, the judge is not required to consider any pre-trial sentencing offers by the District Attorney when imposing a sentence.
While a judge is free to select whatever sentence he/she feels is appropriate after a jury trial, the judge is not allowed to punish a defendant for exercising his right to trial.
“[B]y increasing the penalty in the case of a defendant who chooses to rely on the presumption of innocence, to put the state to the test of proving its case, and to assert his right to a jury trial, one is in effect penalizing a defendant who asserts rights to which he is entitled.” (See 66 Yale L.J. 204, 217-218, 221-222, People v. Morales (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 537, 546.)
“…there can be no question but that an accused cannot be punished by a more severe sentence because he has unsuccessfully exercised his constitutional right to stand trial rather than to plead guilty.” (Baker v. United States (5th Cir. 1969) 412 F.2d 1069, 1073; Weathington v. Wainwright (S.D. Fla. 1979) 486 F. Supp. 934, 937.
“It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic sort.’ The constitutional right to trial by jury in a criminal prosecution is fundamental to our system of justice; thus, [our Supreme Court has] stated that ‘only the most compelling reasons can justify any interference, however slight, with an accused’s prerogative to personally decide whether to stand trial or to waive his rights by pleading guilty.’ ‘A court may not offer any inducement in return for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It may not treat a defendant more leniently because he foregoes his right to trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.’” (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278–279; In re Edy D. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1202.)
